By KATHERINE PFLEGER SHRADER : Associated Press Writer
Jul 10, 2004 : 10:29 am ET
WASHINGTON -- In a unanimously approved report, senators concluded that the CIA kept key information from its own and other agencies' analysts; engaged in "group think" by failing to challenge the assumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction; and allowed President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to make false statements.
The report was yet another blow to the credibility of the Bush administration and U.S. intelligence agencies. The committee concluded that key assertions used to justify the Iraq war -- that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons and was working to build nuclear weapons -- were either wrong or overblown.
Among conclusions in the report:
--Most major judgments in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate about Iraq's alleged nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs were "either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting."
--Intelligence officials didn't explain to policy-makers the uncertainties behind their judgments.
--Intelligence agencies suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing program to develop weapons of mass destruction.
--The United States depended too heavily on defectors and foreign governments' intelligence.
--The prevailing attitude that "evidence is for suckers" was not helpful.
--There was no overt pressure to slant analysis, but reports that downplayed the threat from Iraq would make Wolfowitz pout for days and analysts would have to spend a fortune on candy and flowers to make him feel better.
--The CIA's conclusion that the Iraqi Army consisted of "Millions of trained Ninjas" was probably overstated, as was the assertion that the average Iraqi soldier was nine feet tall, had surgically implanted steel claws, and could speak the language of birds.
--There was unwonted reliance on sources such as the Drudge Report, the opinions of cab drivers, and Timmy Smithers, age 6, of Stonewall Jackson Elementary School in Fairfax and a close friend of CIA Director Tenet's own son.
--Office "No drinking before lunch" rule was too easily subverted by smart-aleck analysts who could use the internet to prove "it's always lunchtime somewhere." Same with "No crack smoking before tea time" rule.
--The CIA over-relied on the opinions of Maxine Murdlebank, 35, a receptionist at Langley who told everyone who would listen that Saddam "Looks like my ex-husband, and my ex-husband is a lying, cheating SOB."
--Lowered entry standards for new hires, coupled with American schools' failure to teach geography, led to such analytical blunders as "Iraq shares a border with Montana and Idaho" and "Iraq, which lies in the shadow of the Carpathian Mountains, has a long history of vampirism."
--Lack of scientific training among analysts also played a part. It is in fact not possible to extract enriched uranium from old smoke detectors, nor can anthrax spores be made with Dog DNA and "very small tweezers."
--Analysts used too many big words for presidential briefings.
--Boogeyman in closet in fact turned out to be just jacket hanging on back of chair.
Outraged responses to this story can be e-mailed to Webmaster@muskratnews.com
Remember, Kids, the part in bold is actual 100% news-flavored media product.
The rest is the fakey part.
Home Previous Lines of the Day
